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The Use of Official Languages Act1 ("the Act") is meant to "regulate and monitor" 
the use of official languages in terms of arguably one of the most inclusive official 
language arrangements of any constitution currently in force. The eleven languages 
recognised as official in terms of section 6(1) of the Constitution2 represent the 
home languages of more than 99 percent of the country’s population. The list of 
official languages includes the languages of groups comprising as little as 1.58 
percent of the total population.3 In addition, the Constitution has also included non-
official languages in the scope of the Pan South African Language Board’s mandate 
"to promote and ensure respect" for languages.4 It is against this background that 
Justice Sachs’ remark that the principle of inclusivity "shines through the language 
provisions" of the Constitution must be seen.5 
                                                          
*  JL (Loot) Pretorius. BCom, LLB, BA Hons, LLD (UFS). Professor in the Department of 
Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law, University of the Free State. Email: 
PretorJL@ufs.ac.za. An abbreviated version of the article was presented as a paper at the 
colloquium: "A Language Act for South Africa? Principles, Viability and Practice", 27 June 2012, 
Bloemfontein. The helpful suggestions of the anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. 
1
 Use of Official Languages Act 12 of 2012.  
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ("the Constitution"). 
3  Statistics South Africa 2001 http://bit.ly/XLjbzQ. 
4  Section 6(5). This category includes the indigenous languages of the Khoi, Nama and San, 
commonly used community languages (including German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Portuguese, 
Tamil, Telegu and Urdu), as well languages used primarily for religious purposes (such as Arabic, 
Hebrew and Sanskrit). 
5  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 363. He was referring to s 3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 ("the interim Constitution"). In so far as the recognition of 
the principle of accommodating linguistic diversity is concerned, the official language provisions 
of the 1996 Constitution do not materially deviate from those of the interim Constitution. See Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 210 ("The balance of NT [1996 text of the 
Constitution] 6 is directed at fostering linguistic diversity. We believe that NT 6 clearly satisfies 
CP [Constitutional Principle] XI in that regard"). On a rhetorical level, however, the interim 
Constitution could be considered to have been more outspoken regarding the promotion of 
multilingualism (s 3(9)(d)). One important omission in the 1996 Constitution is the interim 
Constitution’s commitment regarding the non-diminution of language rights existing at the time 
of its commencement (s 3(9)(f)), which was meant to entrench the privileged position of the two 
languages of European descent, Afrikaans and English. 
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In the perception of many, however, the Act’s commitment to the promotion of 
inclusive linguistic diversity remains ambivalent. Commentators have raised doubt as 
to whether the Act embodies the promotion of multilingualism visibly and forcefully 
enough to be able to counter the continuing trend towards English monolingualism.6 
Given the perceived contradiction it is necessary, therefore, to revisit the 
Constitution’s message regarding multilingualism in order to decide if and how a law 
intended to regulate and monitor official language use could give effect to linguistic 
diversity. 
 
This is not an undemanding interpretive exercise. Part of the problem is the complex 
structure of the official language clause itself. Its apparent ambiguity lies in the fact 
that at face value it is composed of three distinct parts7 without an obvious 
organising principle. The constituent parts are the official language declaration,8 the 
directive principles of state language policy,9 and a catalogue of practical 
considerations to guide restrictive choices regarding official language use.10 What is 
not immediately apparent is how these parts are to interrelate in concrete cases. 
Without an integrating principle, section 6 can be interpreted and applied as nothing 
more than the sum of its disconnected parts.11 The result is that a specific language 
position is often the function of a selective emphasis on a particular part of the 
official language clause. In this way, specific phrases or subclauses of section 6 are 
selectively harnessed in support of particular sectional language interests. What is 
                                                          
6  See Du Plessis 2012 http://bit.ly/YghGr0 11; Alexander 2012 http://bit.ly/12ZqgyH; Du Preez 
2012 http://bit.ly/WO9yj7 1; Law Society 2012 http://bit.ly/Xg5MtU para 4; Azzakani 2012 
http://n24.cm/YyICy2. 
7  Not counting s 6(5) which establishes the Pan South African Language Board. 
8  Section 6(1) declares the official languages of South Africa to be Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, 
siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.  
9  They are the directive to take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance 
the use of the historically diminished indigenous languages (s 6(2)), and the directives that all 
official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and equitable treatment (s 6(4)). For a discussion 
of the nature of these principles as directive principles of state policy, see Du Plessis and 
Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 513-515; and Roederer "Founding Provisions" 13-26. 
10  Section 6(3)(a) provides that the national government and provincial governments may use any 
particular official languages for the purposes of government, taking into account usage, 
practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of 
the population as a whole or in the province concerned; but the national government and each 
provincial government must use at least two official languages.  
11  Du Plessis and Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 507. 
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needed is a basis for integrative reasoning which could coherently relate to one 
another the recognition of the official status of a language, the directive principles 
and the contextual practicalities.    
 
To bring normative coherence to the official language clause requires a broader 
contextual approach which seeks to integrate section 6 in the Constitution’s 
underlying value structure.12 The Constitutional Court has endorsed the notion – 
derived from the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court – that the 
Constitution embodies an objective, normative value system.13 Although the 
selection and designation of values considered to be "basic" and definitive of the 
constitutional value system14 remain contested,15 it is clear nevertheless, as 
Roederer notes, that  
 
the notion of an "objective, normative value system" functions, like the founding 
values, as a standard for all governmental conduct; as a set of values that influence 
the interpretation of the Final Constitution, the Bill of Rights and other legislation; 
and as a set of values that influences whether and how the common law is to be 
developed.16  
                                                          
12  Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) paras 41, 45. 
13  See eg Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 94; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54; Kaunda v President of the RSA 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 
218; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) paras 27-28.  
14  Section 1 of the Constitution lists the following as the founding values of South Africa as "one, 
sovereign, democratic state": human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms; non-racialism and non-sexism; supremacy of the constitution and 
the rule of law; universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a 
multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness. In its interpretation clause (s 39), the Constitution enjoins courts, tribunals and 
forums, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to promote the "values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom". When interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or 
forum must also promote the "spirit, purport and objects" of the Bill of Rights.  
15  Roederer "Founding Provisions" 13-9-13-17; Swanepoel 1998 PER 101-105. 
16  Roederer "Founding Provisions" 13-10. See also Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for 
Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 21: 
"The values enunciated in section 1 of the Constitution are of fundamental importance, they 
inform and give substance to all the provisions of the Constitution"; United Democratic 
Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa (No 2) 2003 1 SA 495 (CC) para 19: 
"These founding values have an important place in our Constitution. They inform the 
interpretation of the Constitution and other law, and set positive standards with which all law 
must comply in order to be valid"; S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 106: "The State has 
accordingly not only the right but the duty to promote the foundational values of the interim 
Constitution." In the same vein, Roux argues that the founding values must be seen as 
"interpretative guidelines, presumptions almost, which favour a certain way of understanding the 
South African constitutional project." See Roux "Democracy" 10-26-10-27. For discussion of the 
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The Constitutional Court also subscribes to the notion that the values constituting 
the basic constitutional value system are mutually interdependent and that 
collectively they form a unified, coherent whole.17 This notion underlies the widely 
endorsed principle of interpretation that constitutional provisions must not be read in 
isolation but in the context of the Constitution as a whole in order to preserve its 
normative unity or "value coherence".18 This means, at a minimum, two things. 
Firstly, constitutional provisions should be interpreted in a way that maintains 
consistency in their meaning, or conceptual integrity regardless of the contexts in 
which they are read, ie interpretation should not result in contradictory or distorted 
meanings being ascribed to the same values or principles in different constitutional 
settings. Secondly, it requires the avoidance of arbitrary or ideologically-inspired 
value hierarchisation. Value competition or tension, in terms of this principle, should 
not be treated as unsolvable inherent value contradictions,19 but by affording all 
competing values the optimal realisation that the circumstances allow.20 In German 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
role of foundational principles in Canadian constitutional law, see Hughes 1999 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 12-17. 
 
17  See eg MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) paras 63-64: "These 
values are not mutually exclusive but enhance and reinforce each other"; De Reuck v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) para 55: "constitutional 
rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value 
system". This is another German doctrinal import. In Matatiele Municipality v President of the 
RSA 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 36, Ngcobo J noted, quoting the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfGE 1, 14, as translated by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 63) that "[o]ur 
Constitution embodies the basic and fundamental objectives of our constitutional democracy. 
Like the German Constitution, it ‘has an inner unity, and the meaning of any one part is linked to 
that of other provisions’. Taken as a unit [our] Constitution reflects certain overarching principles 
and fundamental decisions to which individual provisions are subordinate." On occasion, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court has even referred to this principle as the vornehmstes 
Interpretationsprinzip (most important interpretation principle): BVerfGE 19, 206 at 220.  
18  Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 4 SA 877 (CC) 
para 204 (interpretation must respect the "design and structure of the Constitution as a whole"); 
S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) paras 45, 105 (it is a necessary interpretative technique to give 
"force and effect to the fundamental objectives and aspirations of the Constitution", or to 
preserve the "overall design and purpose of the Constitution"). See also Roederer "Founding 
Provisions" 13-9-13-15.  
19  See in this respect Swanepoel 1998 PER 95-149, who detects a "dialectic value tension" in the 
1996 Constitution, especially between ss 1(a) & 7(1). The analysis, however, seems to be the 
result of interpretively neglecting the principle of harmonisation, and relying too heavily on 
perceived terminological tensions and the histories of the ideological contrasting of particular 
values.  
20  See eg Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 35: "rather than 
envisage the foundational values of the rule of law and the achievement of equality as being 
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constitutional literature, this approach has been captured in theoretical concepts 
such as Harmonisierung (harmonisation),21 praktischer Konkordanz (practical 
concordance),22 or schonender Ausgleich (careful equalisation or balance).23 Hesse, 
for instance, argues that constitutionally recognised goods, in the practical resolution 
of cases, should be related to one another in a way that results in the optimal 
realisation of all. The principle of the unity of the constitution is violated if one 
constitutionally recognised good is realised at the expense of another in the course 
of the unprincipled "balancing" of interests or as a result of an ideological, dogmatic 
or otherwise abstract ranking of social goods. The normative unity of the 
Constitution requires the interpreter to optimise the realisation potential of all 
competing constitutionally recognised goods: all must be set limits in order that all 
may acquire optimal efficacy.24  
 
From a legal-sociological point of view, this "rule of harmonisation" or 
"optimisation"25 is of vital importance for constitutions to realise their socio-political 
integrative function in an optimally accommodative and inclusive manner. In 
concrete cases, value choices correlate and overlap with competing human interests. 
For instance, the deliberations of the Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture on the 
controversial amendment of section 4(b) of the Use of Official Languages Bill26 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinct from and in tension with each other, PIE treats these values as interactive, 
complementary, and mutually reinforcing"; Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police 
Commissioner of the Western Cape 2004 4 SA 444 (C) 452B (the tension between the applicants’ 
property rights and respondents’ right to freedom of movement to be resolved in a manner 
vindicating the rights of all parties to the greatest extent possible). 
21  Scheuner 1963 VVDStRL 125. 
22  Hesse 1993 Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 27.  
23  Lerche "Grundrechtsschranken" 777. 
24  Hesse 1993 Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 27. 
25  Stern Staatsrecht 133. 
26 B23-B-2011 (Use of Official Languages Bill, 2011 (Gen N 737 of GG 34675 of 12 October 2011). 
In the course of the public hearings on the Bill, the chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on 
Arts and Culture mooted the idea that one of the languages designated for official use must 
always be an indigenous language. She is reported to have said that "perhaps consideration 
should be given to making it mandatory that one of the languages was an ‘African language’ as 
in every province, bar KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), English and Afrikaans would always be present. 
These were realities that needed to be raised and addressed" (PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 
2). The Department of Arts and Culture took up the suggestion and included the proposal that 
one of the official languages must be an indigenous language in its submissions before the 
Committee (Department of Arts and Culture 2012 http://bit.ly/112daQ8 para 7.3). This 
culminated in a proposed amendment which provided that a language policy must identity at 
least three official languages that the national department, national public entity or national 
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illustrate how competing language interests are involved in attempts to 
simultaneously implement the values implied in the directive principles of affording 
languages equitable treatment and parity of esteem on the one hand and the 
development of disadvantaged languages on the other hand.27 For the Constitution 
to realise its integrative potential, such choices require an awareness of the pitfalls 
of approaches which lead to marginalisation and exclusion. In Makwanyane28 Sachs 
J therefore cautioned that "[w]hatever the status of earlier legislation and 
jurisprudence may be, the Constitution speaks for the whole of society and not just 
one section".29 
 
The following discussion will consider the implications for an understanding of 
section 6 of interpretively embedding a provision in the underlying basic values of 
the Constitution and reading that provision within the context of the Constitution as 
a whole, in order to preserve the latter’s normative unity. It will be argued that such 
a contextual analysis will confirm the official language clause as a manifestation of 
an unambiguous larger commitment to an inclusive and accommodative approach to 
diversity. The commitment to inclusive linguistic diversity ought therefore to occupy 
the normative centre of section 6. The constitutional analysis will provide the 
background for the consideration of how the Act has given body to this commitment 
in its interpretation of the section 6 instruction to regulate and monitor the use of 
official languages. This involves an inquiry into both the extent to which inclusive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
public enterprise will use for the purposes of government, provided that at least two of the 
official languages identified must be indigenous languages of historically diminished use and 
status. The amendment was later abandoned, after widespread criticism because it could 
effectively have ruled out the use of Afrikaans as an official language, and replaced by the 
provision which requires at least three languages to be designated for official use, coupled with 
the proviso that in making the choice, the diminished use and status of the indigenous languages 
must be given due consideration.  
27  This issue will be referred to again later. 
28  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 362. 
29  See also: Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) para 42: "It was through dialogue 
and sensible accommodation on an inclusive and principled basis that the Constitution itself 
emerged. It would accordingly be perverse to construe its terms in a way that belied or 
minimised the importance of the very inclusive process that led to its adoption, and sustains its 
legitimacy"; Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re: Dispute Concerning the 
Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) 
para 52: "The objective should not be to set the principle of equality against that of cultural 
diversity, but rather to harmonise the two in the interest of both. Democracy in a pluralist society 
should accordingly not mean the end of cultural diversity, but rather its guarantee, accomplished 
on the secure basis of justice and equity." 
JL PRETORIUS  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
287 / 536 
 
linguistic diversity defines the main objectives of the Act, as well as its 
institutionalisation in the implementation forms and structures envisaged by the Act.  
 
2 Constitutional analysis 
 
Since section 6 is about linguistic diversity, one way to go about ensuring that a 
particular reading of it promotes the foundational values of the Constitution and 
their coherence is to investigate how the Constitution positions itself in respect of 
diversity generally. If this should reveal a context-transcending principle, an 
exceptionalist approach in respect of section 6 would require a justification based on 
either unambiguous textual support or some alternative view of the principle 
governing official language use. Such an alternative must, however, itself be in 
harmony with the Constitution’s "objective value system".  
  
2.1 Equality, dignity and citizenship 
 
Logically, an inquiry into the Constitution’s message regarding diversity must start 
with the principle of equality. Apart from the fact that equality is expressly referred 
to as a founding principle of the Constitution,30 it is within a constitution’s notion of 
equality that its defining normative position towards the treatment of difference is 
located.  
 
Already a superficial textual survey of section 9 points towards a predisposition in 
favour of broad inclusive diversity. The prohibited grounds of discrimination listed in 
section 9(3) represent an unusually extensive catalogue of the kinds of difference 
that the Constitution considers worthy of protection, of which linguistic diversity is 
one. In Harksen v Lane31 the Constitutional Court held that what these grounds have 
in common is that they have been misused in the past to categorise, marginalise and 
                                                          
30  Sectionss 1, 7, 36 and 39 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has frequently highlighted 
the centrality of the promotion of equality to the Constitution’s objectives. See in this regard eg S 
v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 155-156, 262; Brink v Kitshoff 1996 4 SA 197 (CC) 
para 33; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 (CC) para 26; Fraser v 
Children’s Court, Pretoria North 1997 2 SA 261 (CC) para 20; President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 
6 BCLR 708 (CC) para 74; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 22. 
31  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. 
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often oppress persons who have been associated with these attributes or 
characteristics. These grounds "have the potential, when manipulated, to demean 
persons in their inherent humanity and dignity". Because of this, the catalogue of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination is explicitly open-ended, since all kinds of 
diversity linked to "attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair 
the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to treat them 
adversely in a comparably serious manner" are in principle afforded protection.32  
 
The apparent textual message of inclusive diversity has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court’s conceptualisation of the right to and value of equality. It has 
rejected a formal conception of equality in favour of the idea of substantive 
equality.33 The Court explained its preference for the latter as the result of both the 
country’s history34 and the underlying values of the Constitution.35 One consequence 
of this approach is the strong emphasis that the Court has placed on remedial or 
restitutive measures36 to address the "stark social and economic disparities" which 
still plague the country as a result of its discriminatory past.37 In addition to the 
remedial dimension, the Court – because of both the transformative historical vision 
and the acceptance of the value of human dignity38 as core concepts underpinning 
                                                          
32  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 54. 
33  Brink v Kitshoff 1996 4 SA 197 (CC) paras 31-44; President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 
para 41; Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 51; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 62. 
34  In Minister of Finance Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 26 the Court said that "[t]he 
equality clause took shape against the backdrop of a society ‘deeply divided, vastly unequal and 
uncaring of human worth’, which produced a legacy of persistent and systemic under-privilege". 
See also Brink v Kitshoff 1996 4 SA 197 (CC) para 40; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) paras 60–61; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC) paras 10, 39, 218, 307 and 322; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 
(CC) para 26; Azanian Peoples Organisation v President of the RSA 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) para 31. 
35  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 26. The Court referred to social 
justice, the aspirational objectives of restoring and protecting the equal worth of everyone, the 
creation of a non-racial, non-sexist society underpinned by human dignity, and the improvement 
of the quality of life of everyone. 
36  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) paras 60-
61; Minister of Finance Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 30. 
37  Minister of Finance Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 23. See also para 31: only by means 
of a positive commitment "progressively to eradicate socially constructed barriers to equality and 
to root out systematic or institutionalised under-privilege" can the constitutional promise of 
equality before the law and its equal protection and benefit be realised. 
38  O’Regan J comments in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328: "The importance of 
dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a 
right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are 
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the notion of equality39 – has also distanced itself from the ambivalent evaluation of 
difference associated with formal conceptions of equality. As Fredman40 explains, 
since formal equality in principle commits to an individualist uniformity or sameness 
of treatment, it is conceptually averse to forms of differential treatment necessary to 
affirm or accommodate difference. Understanding equality in this way could result in 
"collapsing the principle of equality into one of sameness, devaluing difference and 
endorsing assimilation and conformity". Therefore, one of the central features of the 
Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence is the "recognition of difference as a 
positive feature of society".41 In MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay42 Langa CJ 
confirmed the Constitution’s commitment to affirming diversity as follows:  
 
It is a commitment that is totally in accord with this nation's decisive break from its 
history of intolerance and exclusion.... [O]ur constitutional project... not only 
affirms diversity, but promotes and celebrates it. We cannot celebrate diversity by 
permitting it only when no other option remains.43  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of 
many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in Chapter 3." 
39  Fredman Discrimination and Human Rights 15 (the positive affirmation and accommodation of 
difference is part and parcel of the right to equal concern and respect of difference). The 
Constitutional Court has frequently emphasised the centrality of the concept of dignity and self-
worth to the idea of equality: President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41; Prinsloo v 
Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) paras 31-3; Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. 
40  Fredman Discrimination and Human Rights 17. See also Ngwena Disabled People 399 et seq. 
41  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 258. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 131: "It is no exaggeration to say that the success of the whole 
constitutional endeavour in South Africa will depend in large measure on how successfully 
sameness and difference are reconciled"; and at para 134: "What becomes normal in an open 
society, then, is not an imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses to acknowledge 
difference, but the acceptance of the principle of difference itself, which accepts the variability of 
human behaviour"; Pillay v KwaZulu-Natal MEC of Education 2006 10 BCLR 1237 (N) para 41: 
"Substantive equality involves understanding that equality includes a recognition of difference"; 
and at para 46: "the recognition of the cultural diversity of people by judicial officers helps to 
construct a society in which difference and diversity are not tied to prejudice and disadvantage 
but are affirmed and celebrated"; Robinson v Volks 2004 6 BCLR 671 (C) 682: "our constitutional 
society recognises the dignity of difference"; Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re 
Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education 
Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 49: "Stripped of its association with race and political 
dominance, cultural diversity becomes an enriching force which merits constitutional protection, 
thereby enabling the specific contribution of each to become part of the patrimony of the 
whole"; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 60: "Equality means equal concern and respect across 
difference". 
42  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
43  MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 65. See also para 92: "our 
Constitution does not tolerate diversity as a necessary evil, but affirms it as one of the primary 
treasures of our nation."  
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The Constitutional Court has recognised the unique potential of dignity as the 
foundation of substantive equality, and as being able to enhance the latter 
principle’s potential for the positive accommodation of diversity. This point is 
emphasised by Sachs J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice44 in his response to criticism of the Court’s linkage of equality and dignity. 
The right and value of equality, when informed by the imperative of affording all 
persons equal respect and concern, functions as a bulwark against enforced 
uniformity:  
 
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact, uniformity can be the 
enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It 
does not pre-suppose the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for 
human rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality 
therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour but an 
acknowledgment and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that 
difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and 
punishment. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society.45  
 
In light of the above, Du Plessis claims that the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
has the makings of a "jurisprudence of difference", taking its cue from what some 
political theorists have referred to as a politics of difference.46 Such jurisprudence 
"affirms and, indeed, celebrates the Other beyond the confines of mere tolerance or 
even magnanimous recognition and acceptance".47 
 
Ngwena notes that the Constitutional Court has also underpinned the affirmation of 
difference with reference to the notion of a "common or equal citizenship".48 A 
                                                          
44  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
45  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 132. 
In para 134 Sachs J stresses the "acceptance of the principle of difference itself, which accepts 
the variability of human behaviour". 
46  Du Plessis 2009 PER 11. He refers here in particular to the work of Young Justice and the Politics 
of Difference. Young argues (173) that "[a] goal of social justice...is social equality. Equality 
refers not primarily to the distribution of social goods, though distributions are certainly entailed 
by social equality. It refers primarily to the full participation and inclusion of everyone in a 
society's major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop 
and exercise their capacities and realize their choices". 
47  Du Plessis 2009 PER 26. 
48  Ngwena Disabled People 166 et seq. See also August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC) 
para 17: "The achievement of the franchise has historically been important both for the 
acquisition of the rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race, 
and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood"; National Coalition for Gay and 
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characteristic of full citizenship is that it is bestowed upon those that are full 
members of a given historical community so that they stand equal with respect not 
only to duties but more crucially the rights that are bestowed by citizenship status.49 
In sharp distinction to the exclusionary and discriminatory past, the trajectory under 
the new constitutional dispensation clearly points in the opposite direction: "an 
expansive, transformative, but yet to be completely concretised cosmopolitan notion 
of citizenship."50 In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie51 the Constitutional Court held 
that:52 
 
The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a 
common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people as they are. The 
Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of human beings (genetic and socio-
cultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation. 
 
Ngwena draws from the work of Martha Minow,53 who develops a thesis of 
difference that has inclusive citizenship as its goal. He points out that the paradigm 
shift in the perception of difference that Minow propagates is a turn from a focus on 
differentiating between people for the purpose of creating boundaries to a focus on 
differentiating in order to create positive relationships, which she calls the social 
relations approach.54 If substantive equality and inclusive citizenship are taken 
seriously, forms of categorisation which have the effect of legitimising status 
subordination should reflexively become a cause for alarm. As Ngwena argues, what 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 134: "The acknowledgment and 
acceptance of difference is particularly important in our country where group membership has 
been the basis of express advantage and disadvantage. The development of an active rather 
than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and 
accepting people as they are". 
49  Section 3 of the Constitution proclaims "a common South Africa citizenship" as a foundational 
value. This entails that citizens are "equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of 
citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship". See Kaunda v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 10 BCLR 1009 (CC) paras 237-238. The right not 
to be deprived of citizenship is guaranteed in s 20 of the Constitution. 
50  Ngwena Disabled People 167. See also Ngwena and Pretorius 2012 SAJHR 81-115.  
51  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC).  
52  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para 60. See also National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 127: "it is the denial of full 
moral citizenship in society because you are what you are, that impinges on the dignity and self-
worth of a group". 
53  Minow Making All the Difference 110, 173-224. 
54  See also Botha 2003 TSAR 20 (constructing categories in relational terms implies consciousness 
of the constitutional imperatives of respecting the human dignity and equality of all). 
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should be guarded against are thought processes guided by "the logic of social 
group reductionism that draws its impulse from cultural and institutional modes of 
social division that have historically been oppressive".55 Constitutionally, what is 
important is not categorisation or the recognition of difference per se, but to avoid 
negative hierarchical categorisation which affords "legitimacy to social constructions 
of difference that are historically privileged and are used, or can be used, to create 
and sustain hierarchical human essences as apartheid shamelessly did".56 Our own 
history testifies to the fact that categorisation is not a random process devoid of any 
value system and normative implications.57 It can be invoked for benevolent as well 
as malevolent purposes to enable or disable, to maximise or minimise the life 
chances of groups relative to another. The notions of inclusive citizenship and 
substantive equality  
 
beckon us towards a theory of relational differentiation or categorisation that is 
acutely responsive to the ethics of erasing systemic inequality, respecting human 
dignity and banishing master dichotomies and their universes of superior and 
subordinate social castes.58 
 
Fredman’s conceptualisation of equality59 sums up the main dimensions of a 
substantive notion of equality informed by the affirmation of human dignity and 
equal citizenship. She identifies four specific substantive equality aims:  
 
First, substantive equality should aim to break the cycle of disadvantage associated 
with outgroups. Second, it should promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of 
all, thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of 
membership of an out-group. Third, it should entail positive affirmation and 
celebration of identity within community, and, finally, it should facilitate full 
participation in society. 
 
                                                          
55  Ngwena and Pretorius 2012 SAJHR 112. 
56  Ngwena Disabled People 84. 
57  Ngwena Disabled People 110. 
58  Ngwena Disabled People 84. 
59  Fredman 2005 SAJHR 167. See also Fredman Discrimination and Human Rights 15. 
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Fredman’s framework provides a useful basis for formulating some conclusions 
regarding the interpretation of section 6 of the Constitution in the light of the 
underlying foundational constitutional values of equality, dignity and citizenship, and 
the notion of inclusive diversity that they inspire. Firstly, the unequivocal 
constitutional affirmation of diversity – or the acceptance of the "principle of 
difference" itself, as Sachs J called it60 – requires language choices to be driven by 
an impulse of affirmation rather than negation and the exclusion of linguistic 
diversity. Albertyn writes that part of the project of realising substantive equality is 
the untying of difference from hierarchies, exclusion and disadvantage.61 
Fundamental to the transformative mission of the Constitution is the "ability to 
establish or facilitate new and non-hierarchical normative frameworks of 
participation and social inclusion".62 To paraphrase Ngwena, section 9 of the 
Constitution’s message is that language is meant to be a category of inclusion, 
rather than exclusion, and the acceptance of diversity rather than a hierarchy of 
linguistic forms.63 Substantive equality’s emphasis on inclusivity prevents linguistic 
difference from becoming entangled in strategic power discourses in which groups 
are distinguished and positioned against one another, or for linguistic difference 
from becoming strategically necessary for the maintenance or consolidation of 
political power in institutional or ideological forms.64  
 
Secondly, the existence of the element of dignity in the concept of equality has 
important consequences for an understanding of the directive principles of equitable 
treatment, parity of esteem, the development of historically diminished indigenous 
languages and promoting and ensuring respect for non-official community and 
religious languages. The phrases "parity of esteem" and "the promotion and 
assurance of respect" are in themselves already explicit dignity-related 
expressions.65 They (together with the other directives referred to above) acquire 
                                                          
60  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 134. 
61  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 260. 
62  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 260.  
63  Ngwena Disabled People 105.  
64  Ngwena Disabled People 102. 
65  See Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of 
Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC) para 47 per 
Sachs J: "all languages [are] not simply a means of communication and instruction, but a central 
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even more constitutional pungency when their relation to the rights and values of 
human dignity and substantive equality – of which they are a particular contextual 
expression – is kept in mind. This relationship affords them a special status at the 
centre of the Constitution’s normative core. Directive principles of state policy of this 
kind, which overlap with and are particularised expressions of the foundational 
principles of the Constitution, must therefore be accorded high priority, even though 
they do not lead to directly enforceable individual claims under all circumstances.66 
Bolstered by the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, they nevertheless 
are clearly binding instructions which require at the very minimum reasonable 
measures of realisation.  
 
Thirdly, the remedial dimension of substantive equality referred to above – in 
conjunction with the value of dignity – serves to sharpen the senses for the full 
normative implications of the directive principle of elevating the status and 
advancing the use of the historically diminished indigenous languages. This 
developmental directive is integrally part and parcel of the broad transformative 
(remedial or restitutive) project inherent in the notion of substantive equality. As a 
prelude to the developmental directive, section 6(2) therefore starts with the 
recognition of the need to redress the "historically diminished use and status of the 
indigenous languages of our people." The state must take practical and positive 
measures to elevate their status and advance their use. Section 6(2) signals a clear 
intention to address the consequences of at least two of the paradigms which 
underpinned the language policy and practices of the apartheid era, namely the 
ethnically determined geographical fragmentation of language rights and the 
privileged position of languages of European origin (English and Afrikaans). In terms 
of the first paradigm, indigenous African languages found official recognition only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
element of community cohesion and identification for a distinct community in South Africa." The 
link between equality, dignity and the affirmation of identity implied in respecting linguistic rights 
is also stressed in the Oslo Recommendations on the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities 
(1998) (OSCE 1998 http://bit.ly/16Ai339). In the explanatory note, it is said that "[e]quality in 
dignity and rights presupposes respect for the individual's identity as a human being. Language 
is one of the most fundamental components of human identity. Hence, respect for a person's 
dignity is intimately connected with respect for the person's identity and consequently for the 
person's language". 
66  Du Plessis and Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 514-515. 
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within the geographical confines of the nominally independent or self-governing 
ethnic "homelands". In terms of the second paradigm, the equal treatment of 
languages in the rest of South Africa was limited to the equal treatment of the two 




The principle of proportionality is textually located in section 36 of the Constitution, 
which sets out the conditions under which the rights recognised in the Bill of Rights 
may be limited.68 It is therefore intimately connected with the effective realisation of 
fundamental rights, a fact recognised in other jurisdictions also.69 Proportionality’s 
importance in this context alone therefore justifies classifying it as a foundational 
principle. As such, it is clearly relevant to measures implementing the language 
provisions of section 6. Although section 6 falls outside the Bill of Rights and by 
implication section 36, its implementation – as the above analysis has shown – 
necessarily involves competing official language claims which overlap with and are 
inextricably linked to the competing claims of other fundamental rights (eg equality, 
dignity, citizenship). Proportionality is therefore relevant as the fundamental 
constitutional principle governing competing claims of this nature. 
 
                                                          
67  Du Plessis and Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 515. The promise of s 6(2) for the elevation of the official 
use of the indigenous languages remains, however, largely unfulfilled. Whereas the privileged 
position of Afrikaans as an official language has diminished considerably since 1994, English has 
acquired the de facto status of the official lingua franca. See in this respect Malan 2012 LitNet 
Akademies 59-62. 
68  See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104 (the limitation of constitutional rights for a 
purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of 
competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality); Harksen v Lane 1998 
1 SA 300 (CC) para 5 (the limitations clause will involve a weighing of the purpose and effect of 
the provision in question and a determination as to the proportionality thereof in relation to the 
extent of its infringement of equality); Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 1 SA 1171 (CC) para 29 (s 36 of 
the Constitution requires an analysis of proportionality and a weighing up of the relevant 
factors).  
69  The German Federal Constitutional Court has depicted proportionality as a principle derived from 
the very nature of fundamental constitutional rights, since the latter express the general claim of 
citizens not to be restricted by public authorities more than is necessary in the public interest in 
the exercise of their freedoms (BVerfGE 65, 1 (44); BVerfGE 19, 342 (348 et seq). Beatty 
Ultimate Rule of Law 114 links proportionality not only to the concept of rights but also to the 
rule of law more generally.  
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Proportionality’s role as an integrative principle for competing fundamental rights 
claims is, however, only part of its broader foundational constitutional function when 
viewed from the perspective of the socio-political integrative role that all 
constitutions have to perform in order to be effective.70 This constitutional function 
underlies, as was noted above, the notion of the constitution as embodying a 
coherent, interrelated and interdependent normative structure. If a constitution is to 
function as such, it needs to maintain a proportional balance between competing 
constitutional goods (values, principles, rights and interests). Beatty argues that 
without a principled way of reconciling the competing goods that are part of every 
case, a constitution would quickly become "encrusted in a jurisprudence of confusion 
and contradiction and courts would themselves become one of the ‘naked power 
organs’ they were meant to suppress".71 His comparative analysis of a number of 
jurisdictions shows that all constitutional integrative principles (such as 
reasonableness72 or fairness73) operate with some element of proportionality at their 
conceptual core.  
 
Given its comprehensive role, some commentators consider the principle of 
proportionality as central to a constitutional democracy.74 In the case of the South 
African Constitution, the latter is expressed in the notion of "an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom", ie the integrative normative 
ideal to which South Africa constitutionally aspires.75 Proportionality is instrumentally 
                                                          
70  For an overview of the wide applicability of "proportionality principles" in different domains of the 
law, see Sullivan and Frase Proportionality Principles. 
71  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 163. 
72  See Sachs J in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 637: 
"Proportionality will always be a significant element of reasonableness". Sullivan and Frase 
Proportionality Principles 3 argue that proportionality in one form or another is engaged 
whenever government intrusion excessively invades individual rights, or whenever individual 
action invades the rights of others, or even when governmental action unduly invades the 
powers of another branch or level of government. For the relationship between reasonableness 
and proportionality in administrative law review, see Hoexter Administrative law 309-312.  
73  For a discussion of the element of proportional balancing inherent in the application of the 
fairness test in terms of s 9(3) of the Constitution, see Pretorius 2010 SAJHR 552-553. 
74  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 163: "The fact is that proportionality is an integral, indispensible 
part of every constitution that subordinates the system of government it creates to the rule of 
law. It is constitutive of their structure, an integral part of every constitution by virtue of their 
status as the supreme law within the nation state." 
75  Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) para 46, 
with reference to the notion of an open and democratic society, remarked: "The notion of an 
open and democratic society is thus not merely aspirational or decorative, it is normative, 
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linked to the rule of law and an essential safeguard against the abuse of power. It 
embodies the fundamental principle that government actions should not be 
demonstrably excessive relative to their moral and practical justifications.76  
 
Expressed in its broadest and most abstract sense, proportionality is – as the legal 
theorist Robert Alexy argues – a principle of optimisation.77 Its function is to 
optimally facilitate the realisation-potential of constitutional values or principles in 
concrete cases. All constitutional values and principles share the characteristic of 
being norms which must be realised optimally, ie to the greatest extent possible.78 
He argues that 
 
principles are norms which require that something be realized to the greatest 
extent possible given their legal and factual possibilities. Principles are optimization 
requirements characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying 
degrees, and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what 
is factually possible but also on what is legally possible. The scope of the legally 
possible is determined by opposing principles and rules.79 
 
It is the primary function of the proportionality principle to relate competing 
constitutional values or principles and their correlative rights or interests optimally to 
one another in the context of the circumstances of a particular case.80 This is well 
captured in the notion of "practical concordance", which the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has adopted in following Hesse to guide its judgment in cases 
involving competing rights claims.81 It requires that contending constitutional goods 
must be harmonised in a way "that will preserve as much of each of them as is 
possible".82 To comply with this principle, the state bears the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
furnishing the matrix of ideals within which we work, the source from which we derive the 
principles and rules we apply and the final measure we use for testing the legitimacy of 
impugned norms and conduct." 
76  Sullivan and Frase Proportionality Principles 6. 
77  Alexy Theory of Constitutional Rights 66. This also shows proportionality’s relationship with the 
rule of law as supremacy of the constitution: ie optimisation is what is required if all 
constitutionally endorsed values and principles are truly taken seriously.  
78  Kumm 2004 IJCL 579. 
79  Alexy Theory of Constitutional Rights 47-8. 
80  See Chapman 2010 UTLJ 177-196.  
81  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 45-49 discusses some of the cases where the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has applied this principle. 
82  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 46. 
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demonstrating that "it has reached an 'optimisation of the affected conflicting 
interests’ and has avoided policies that are 'excessive'".83  
 
Alexy subscribes to the standard three-pronged version of the proportionality test, 
namely suitability, necessity and proportionality in its narrow sense.84 The 
requirement of "suitability" entails that a measure that restricts a principle must be 
closely connected to the realisation of another normative principle.85 Secondly, 
"necessity" involves that if a principle could be equally effectively realised by more 
than one means, the measure least intrusive of the infringed principle must be 
selected.86 The third element is referred to as "balancing in the narrow sense". It 
involves a process of assessing the relative "weight" of the substantive 
considerations underlying each competing principle in the circumstances of a given 
case.87 The important point to note is that the analytical elements of the 
proportionality test are individually and collectively focused on the imperative of 
realising competing constitutional values or principles to the greatest extent 
possible.88 The first two requirements (suitability and necessity) focus on empirical 
concerns, demanding that values or principles be realised to the greatest extent that 
                                                          
83  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 46. 
84  Alexy Theory of Constitutional Rights 66. Although s 36 of the South African Constitution is not 
worded in this specific form and is not applied in the same logical sequence, it is submitted that 
in substance the same basic analytical elements are present. See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 
391 (CC) fn 130: "A proportionality test is applied to the limitation of fundamental rights by the 
Canadian courts, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human 
Rights. Although the approach of these Courts to proportionality is not identical, all recognise 
that proportionality is an essential requirement of any legitimate limitation of an entrenched 
right. Proportionality is also inherent in the different levels of scrutiny applied by United States 
courts to governmental action." 
85  In s 36 of the South African Constitution this aspect of proportionality is contained in the 
requirement that the limitation of a right must be closely connected to the purpose it seeks to 
achieve (Bilchitz 2010 SAPR/PL 426). 
86  Section 36 of the South African Constitution also stipulates as one of the factors for 
contextualising the justifiability of limitations of human rights a consideration of whether or not 
the purpose of the limitation could have been achieved by less restrictive means. 
87  Alexy Theory of Constitutional Rights 67. In S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104 
Chaskalson P said that "[t]he limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable 
and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality". 
88  Alexy 2005 IJCL 572-573: "All these principles give expression to the idea of optimization. 
Interpreting constitutional rights in light of the principle of proportionality is to treat 
constitutional rights as optimization requirements, that is, as principles, not simply as rules. As 
optimization requirements, principles are norms requiring that something be realized to the 
greatest extent possible, given the factual and legal possibilities."   
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is factually possible. The third requirement (balancing) is normative, requiring that 
they be realised to the greatest extent in the light of countervailing norms.89  
 
Applied to section 6 of the Constitution, proportionality demands in general that the 
principle of inclusive linguistic diversity expressed in the official language clause 
must be related to other competing values, principles or considerations in a way 
which is non-reductionist and non-hierarchical. Non-reductionism requires that 
competing constitutional goods should be related to one another in a way which 
"preserves [their] plurality ... without reducing one ... into another and without 
lumping all of them together into some common space (like utility) that denies their 
plurality".90 Non-hierarchical relatedness means that constitutional goods must not 
be pitched against each other in terms of an arbitrary abstract rank order. With 
reference to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court Beatty 
suggests that the proper approach to follow in order to attain the appropriate 
balance is "that no one of the conflicting legal positions be preferred and maximally 
asserted, but all given as protective as possible an arrangement".91  
 
In more specific terms, the principle of proportionality seems especially relevant 
regarding two problematic areas of the application of the official language clause. 
The first concerns the relationship of the directive principles of state language policy 
(parity of esteem, equitable treatment and the development of indigenous 
languages) to practical considerations which may stand in the way of their optimal 
realisation at a given moment in time. Section 6(3)(a) provides that in the actual 
choice of language for government use, cognisance should be taken of factors such 
as usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs 
and preferences of the population. It was seen above that the proportionality 
requirements of suitability and necessity have the objective of steering this 
relationship in the direction of an outcome in which principles are realised to the 
greatest extent that is practically possible. If section 6 contains an unequivocal 
commitment to inclusive diversity, the qualifying factors cannot be accorded a 
                                                          
89  Kumm 2004 IJCL 579.  
90  Chapman 2010 UTLJ 188. 
91  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 47.  
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function which diverts the focus from the realisation of the directive principles of 
state language policy. They can therefore not be allowed to dictate language choices 
on the same level as the directive principles or undermine the official status of 
languages.92 Their function is to keep language claims based on those directive 
principles within reasonable bounds by indicating a relevant contextual framework 
for balancing competing language demands, or integrating language claims with 
other constitutionally recognised interests. What would be wrong, however, is to 
treat the practical factors as constituting an unalterable factual environment for the 
exercise of language rights, which must be accepted as a given state of affairs. If 
need be, it is this very factual environment which the directive principles are meant 
to transform in order to make it progressively more accommodative of and 
conducive to official language diversity.  
 
To ascribe normative compulsion to the practical factors as such is to turn their 
relationship with the directives on its head. This is quite clear in the case of the 
development directive. The mere fact that a particular language is under-developed, 
or has historically enjoyed no or only modest popular preference as an official 
language, or would require the allocation of considerable resources to become an 
eligible candidate for official use, does not justify inaction as far as the constitutional 
instruction to take practical and positive measures to elevate its status and advance 
its use is concerned. The same applies to the other directive principles. Parity of 
esteem, for instance, also seems to harbour an element of progressive realisation, 
which in the context of the language clause means the creation of conditions 
promoting inclusive linguistic diversity. As argued elsewhere,93 in view of the marked 
differences in historical privilege and levels of development, parity of esteem is not a 
state of affairs to be maintained, but a goal to be achieved. This may require 
progressively upgrading the use of previously excluded or underdeveloped languages 
in key aspects of the process of legislation, in the courts and in public 
administration. Parity of esteem sets as a goal the achievement of a state of affairs 
where each official language has attained the status of a regular and visible medium 
                                                          
92  Du Plessis and Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 526. 
93  Du Plessis and Pretorius 2000 SAPR/PL 520. 
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of official communication. It is clearly incompatible with language domination or 
hierarchisation, as well as with official monolingualism. 
 
The second aspect concerns the interrelationship of the directive principles 
themselves. As was noted above, the controversy surrounding the proposed 
amendment to section 4(b) of the Use of Official Languages Bill has illustrated the 
extent to which the directive principles themselves can be perceived to contradict 
one another. The attempt to give effect to the directive of enhancing the status and 
use of the historically diminished indigenous languages was believed to require a 
choice incompatible with simultaneously respecting the parity of esteem and 
equitable treatment of Afrikaans. The proportionality principle requires a mindset 
that refrains from approaching competing principles and the rights or interests they 
represent in such oppositional terms. As was explained earlier, proportionality strives 
for an outcome where values or principles are related to one another in a way which 
confirms their constitutional status by affording to each of them optimal realisation 
in the given circumstances. This means that they are always mutually – and never 
unilaterally – limiting vis a vis one another. This is what Beatty means when he 
writes that proportionality requires that "no one of the conflicting legal positions be 
preferred and maximally asserted, but all given as protective as possible an 
arrangement",94 or what Hesse attempted to express in the principle of practical 
concordance, which envisages that in order for the realisation potential of all 
competing constitutionally recognised goods to be optimised, all must be set limits in 
order that all may acquire optimal efficacy.95  
 
Against the background of this constitutional analysis, the Act itself can be evaluated 
next. The main focus is on the prominence attached to the promotion of inclusive 
linguistic diversity (or multilingualism) in the Act. This cannot be deduced only from 
the rhetorical affirmation of inclusive linguistic diversity in the Act itself. What is 
more important is the institutional setting for and legal form in which this principle 
will be realised. It will appear that the Act reflects a limited normative understanding 
                                                          
94  Beatty Ultimate Rule of Law 47. 
95  Hesse Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 27. 
JL PRETORIUS  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
302 / 536 
 
of the constitutional instruction to "regulate and monitor language use". As a result, 
the Act is Spartan in supplying instructive normative standards for use in making 
official language choices. Instead, the responsibility for the latter has been entrusted 
to the policy functions of institutionally non-independent administrative organs 
within national state departments, public entities and enterprises, with largely 
advisory functions. 
 
3 The Act’s message regarding the promotion of multilingualism 
 
The preamble of the Act starts by confirming the official status of the eleven 
languages recognised as such in section 6(1) of the Constitution. It acknowledges 
the constitutional obligation that the "use of the Republic’s official languages must 
be promoted and pursued", and reiterates the sections 6(2) and (4) directive 
principles. The directive principles, with the noted exception of the development 
directive, are again repeated in the section stipulating the objects of the Act. 
Section 2 provides that the Act aims to regulate and monitor the use of official 
languages for government purposes by national government; promote the parity of 
esteem and equitable treatment of official languages of the Republic; facilitate 
equitable access to the services provided by national government and the 
information available from it; and promote good language management by 
national government for efficient public service administration and to meet the 
needs of the public.     
 
The true test for the saliency afforded to the promotion of inclusive linguistic 
diversity is, however, the extent to which this principle is institutionalised in the 
operational body of the Act as such. It appears that the real responsibility for 
decisions regarding official language use is located in the policy-making competence 
of administrative bodies. Section 4(1) obliges national departments, national public 
entities and enterprises to adopt within 18 months a language policy on their use of 
official languages for government purposes. The matters that must be addressed in 
the language policy include: identifying at least three official languages to be used; 
stipulating how official languages will be used in government communication, 
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notices, publications, etc; describing how the public will access language policy; 
providing a complaints mechanism to deal with the use of official languages; and 
describing how national government will communicate with members of the public 
whose language of choice is not one of the identified official languages or is South 
African Sign Language.  
 
The important point to consider is therefore the Act’s normative framework for policy 
formulation and the prominence that is accorded to the promotion of inclusive 
linguistic diversity in this respect. The Act expressly requires compliance with two 
guidelines only. Section 4(2)(a) provides that language policies must comply with the 
provisions of section 6(3) of the Constitution which, as has been noted above – 
apart from prescribing a minimum of two languages for official use – contains the 
practical factors to consider when making restrictive language choices. Thus, the 
emphasis placed on section 6(3) is not particularly encouraging. On its own, it is 
devoid of all inclusivity-specific guidelines, and when severed from the directive 
principles, it mandates unguided discretionary powers to limit official language use.  
 
Seen from the perspective of inclusivity, the Act96 does improve on section 6(3)(a) of 
the Constitution in one respect by prescribing the identification of at least three 
official languages that national departments, public entities and enterprises must 
use for government purposes.97 This is followed (in section 4(3)) by the proviso that 
in identifying at least three official languages, every national department, national 
public entity and enterprise must take into account its obligation to take practical 
and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of indigenous 
languages of historically diminished use and status.  
 
Unlike the development directive, the directive principles of the promotion of parity 
of esteem and the equitable treatment of official languages are not mentioned 
specifically as binding guidelines for official language policy-making in section 4. 
Instead, it is notable that the responsibility for the promotion of these two directive 
                                                          
96  Section 4(2)(b). 
97  Du Plessis 2012 http://bit.ly/YghGr0 19. 
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principles – which are most closely related to the promotion of multilingualism – has 
been expressly allocated to largely non-independent advisory and monitoring bodies. 
The language policies and practices of national departments, public entities and 
enterprises will be monitored by a national language unit and language units within 
the national departments, public enterprises and entities.98 One of the functions of 
the National Language Unit is to advise the Minister of Arts and Culture on policy 
and strategy "to promote parity of esteem and equitable treatment of the official 
languages of the Republic and facilitate equitable access to the services and 
information of national departments, national public entities and national public 
enterprises".99 Similarly, the departmental, public enterprise and entity language 
units have the advisory and monitoring function "to promote parity of esteem and 
equitable treatment of official languages of the Republic and facilitate equitable 
access to services and information of the national department, national public entity 
or national public enterprise concerned".100  
 
Curiously, the directive principle of elevating the status and advancing the use of the 
historically diminished indigenous languages is absent from the list of functions of 
these bodies. This uneven treatment of the directive principles is puzzling. Only the 
development directive is explicitly given as a binding guideline for official language 
policy in section 4, but it is not included as a function of the language units. Omitted 
from the context of expressly listed binding policy guidelines, parity of esteem and 
equitable treatment are downgraded to the sphere of competence of advisory 
bodies. There is no constitutional basis for this apparent prioritisation, and it makes 
the Act’s commitment to the promotion of multilingualism at best incoherent and at 
worst dubious.   
 
The ambivalence regarding the promotion of multilingualism is echoed in official 
statements regarding the main objectives of the Act. There appears to be some 
confusion in the reasoning of the Department of Arts and Culture in this respect. On 
the one hand, spokespersons for the Department appear to situate the Act firmly 
                                                          
98  Sections 6 and 7. 
99  Section 6(1)(a)(ii). 
100  Section 8(e). 
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within the inclusive diversity vision of section 6 of the Constitution. For instance, the 
Director General described this as one of the "key principles" of the Act.101 The 
Department’s director of legal services echoed this sentiment in the Department’s 
submissions to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture: "the idea 
was that everyone would have a duty to advance multilingualism, as a constitutional 
obligation".102 This was qualified somewhat by the reminder that the Act would be 
only one of the instruments used to promote multilingualism.103 The Department 
was said to have opted to pursue inclusive multilingualism incrementally, unlike the 
2003 Language Act which purportedly was "too wide". It was said that the Act must 
therefore be seen as a first step to "opening more doors" and as "providing a 
beginning which would eventually lead to the promotion, use and development of all 
official languages".104  
 
On the other hand, however, spokespersons for the Department were at pains to 
distance the Act from such an ambitious objective. In the Department’s submissions 
to the Portfolio Committee, it was contended that although the Department 
acknowledges the concerns relating to multilingualism and the application of section 
6(2) of the Constitution, "this Bill is not the appropriate mechanism to address these 
concerns."105 This was said in the context of responding to a submission that the Bill 
should include as its objective the promotion of multilingualism. In the opinion of the 
Department, the latter is the proper domain of the National Languages Policy 
Framework (2003), the Implementation Plan (2003) and the Pan South African 
                                                          
101  PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 2: "There were three key principles, which were the promotion of 
use of language, access to information and services, and good language management by 
government departments." 
102  PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 2.  
103  PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 2. See also Department of Arts and Culture 2012 
http://bit.ly/112daQ8 para 3.2: "It is evident that the provisions of section 6 give effect to 
Constitutional Principle CP XI that 'the diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged 
and protected, and conditions for their promotion shall be encouraged'."  
104  PMG 2012 http://bit.ly/ZIxaAP 4. 
105  Department of Arts and Culture 2012 http://bit.ly/112daQ8 para 7.1. See also para 6.1.3: "there 
is no constitutional obligation on government to promulgate legislation to give effect to section 
6(2) of the Constitution". The Deputy Minister for Arts and Culture is also reported to have 
stated that "[t]he Bill was secondary in terms of promoting multilingualism; the primary piece of 
legislation on this matter was the PanSALB Act. The drafters should look at drafting guiding 
principles that would link the two pieces of legislation and give effect to PanSALB" (PMG 2012 
http://bit.ly/ZIxaAP 4).  
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Language Board.106 The Minister is also credited with the astonishing remark that 
"[s]ince the PANSALB Act promoted multilingualism, the Bill could not do the same 
thing as this would cause duplication".107 In terms of the Constitution108 and its 
constituent act,109 the Pan South African Language Board has a specific and limited 
language mandate which obviously does not cancel out the responsibility of other 
state organs to promote multilingualism. What is more, confining the constitutional 
obligation of the promotion of multilingualism to the advisory functions of the Pan 
South African Language Board would clearly imply downgrading a peremptory 
constitutional norm to a non-binding guideline.  
 
4 Relegating the most important normative choices regarding official 
language use to the domain of administrative policy-making 
 
Apart from the reference to the directive principles in the different contexts referred 
to above, the Act stipulates no other guiding norms for language policy. Most 
crucially, the Act does not provide any normative guidance of its own, either in the 
form of substantive guidelines or even interpretive guidance on the meaning of the 
constitutional directive principles of official language policy. The responsibility for 
making the most important normative choices regarding the use of official languages 
thus has not been reserved for the legislative process but has been assigned to 
administrative policy-making organs.  
 
The fate of the 2003 Languages Bill has made it clear that it never was the intention 
of the government to be bound by legislation in this respect. As is common 
knowledge now, the Department of Arts and Culture presented the South African 
Languages Bill to the cabinet in 2003. This Bill gave a much more pronounced profile 
to the promotion of multilingualism as a binding constitutional obligation. It stated 
that one of its objects was to enable all South Africans to use the official languages 
                                                          
106  Department of Arts and Culture 2012 http://bit.ly/112daQ8 para 7.1. See also PMG 2012 
http://bit.ly/ZIxaAP 3: "Mr Paul Mashatile, Minister of the DAC said that he agreed that the issue 
of multilingualism was very important. The role of promoting multilingualism had to be played by 
PanSALB in addition to promoting, preserving and developing languages."  
107  PMG 2012 http://bit.ly/ZIxaAP 4.  
108  Section 6(5) of the Constitution. 
109  Pan South African Language Board Act 59 of 1995 (referred to as "the PanSALB Act"). 
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of their choice "as a matter of right" within the range of contexts specified in the Bill 
(section 2). It contained an extensive list of guiding principles and more detailed 
guidance regarding language policy (section 5). Cabinet did not approve the Bill and 
requested the Minister of Arts and Culture, in consultation with the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, to investigate other non-legislative ways to 
regulate official language use for government purposes.110  
 
The Lourens judgment111 has, however, forced the government to come up with a 
language act of some sort. The Act has, nevertheless, in effect changed very little 
regarding the political choice of not incorporating binding normative standards for 
official language use in legislation.112 The practical effect of the Act is that the latter 
is still a matter of policy, not legislation. Therefore, those who have depicted the Act 
as merely an organisational law are quite correct.113 The Act simply has no 
normative message of its own regarding the critical standards for making official 
language choices, a fact which more than anything else accentuates the hollow 
victory that the Lourens judgment represents. This is reminiscent of a comment of 
Roux in a different context: "Values after all, provide standards against which 
conduct may be measured, whereas institutions are only valuable to the extent that 
they serve a valued purpose."114  
 
Relegating the most important normative guidelines governing official language use 
to the domain of administrative policy-making rather than legislation is 
constitutionally questionable on a number of grounds. Firstly, although it is true that 
the Constitution does not limit the means of implementation of the instruction to 
"regulate and monitor the use of official languages" to legislation, one would have 
                                                          
110  PMG 2011 http://bit.ly/ZQrEO5 1. 
111  Lourens v President van die RSA, Unreported, Case No 49807/09, North Gauteng High Court. 
112  This was well appreciated by one of the Democratic Alliance’s representatives on the Portfolio 
Committee (Dr Annelie Lotriet), who pointed out that "the Bill had been drafted to comply with 
the court order and not to promote multilingualism and address the language issue in South 
Africa" (PMG 2012 http://bit.ly/ZIxaAP 3). 
113  Du Plessis 2012 http://bit.ly/YghGr0 13. He contrasts the Act with a "national language law" and 
describes it as rather an "administrative language arrangement" (administratiewe taalreëling) or 
a "language scheme" (taalskema) in the vein of the Welsh Language Schemes or Language 
Measure. 
114  Roux "Democracy" 10-63.  
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expected core normative standards guiding the implementation of the directive 
principles to be embodied in a legal form with a binding force commensurate with 
the foundational nature of the constitutional principles involved. To have chosen the 
mechanism of administrative policy to bear the brunt of both the interpretive and 
implementation work does not demonstrate the legislature’s commitment to the 
values underlying section 6 of the Constitution.  
 
Secondly, this modus operandi is democratically deficient. Typically, decisions of a 
fundamental constitutional nature of this kind should enjoy maximum democratic 
legitimacy and therefore be the preserve of the legislature, and not be assigned to 
administrative organs. The South African Constitution does not expressly subscribe 
to a doctrine similar to the German notion of the Gesetzesvorbehalt115 in terms of 
which fundamental decisions regarding the limitation of rights and other important 
constitutional positions are reserved for Parliament. However, this doctrine seems to 
reflect such a basic democratic sentiment that it is also relevant for South African 
constitutional law, which affords democracy pride of place amongst its foundational 
values.116 Surrendering to administrative bodies the competence to make decisions 
which reflect relatively unfettered basic constitutional value judgments sidesteps the 
democratic guarantees of the legislative process in terms of compulsory publicity, 
broad public involvement and minority party participation.117 These requirements 
have a democratic, legitimising function only if they are facilitated in the process 
where the fundamentally important decisions are made, which is not the case where 
Parliament abdicates its legislative responsibility in favour of executive or 
administrative bodies.  
                                                          
115  Article 20(3) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. See generally Hesse 
Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts 83, 207-208; Leibholz, Rinck and Hesselbeger Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol 1 § 20 1026 et seq, Vol 2 §70 31 et seq.  
116  Section 1 of the Constitution. 
117  See Roux "Democracy" 10-38 et seq. Fredericks Protection of Languages 92-93 correctly argues 
that official language legislation must comply with the requirements laid down by the 
Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 
2006 6 SA 416 (CC). In that case the Court declared the impugned legislation invalid for failing 
to provide for public participation in the form of public hearings. The court interpreted the 
obligation to facilitate public participation (ss 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a) & 118(1)(a)) to be based on the 
constitutional commitment to democracy and the principles of accountability and transparency. 
See also Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2006 5 BCLR 622 (CC) 
para 110: "In our constitutional order, the legitimacy of laws made by Parliament comes not 
from awe, but from openness." 
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Thirdly, affording insufficiently normatively circumscribed discretionary power to 
administrative bodies compromises both the separation of powers and the principle 
of legal certainty as fundamental tenets of the rule of law. One important instance of 
how the legislature exercises its control function over the executive and 
administration – as part of the "checks and balances" that the separation of powers 
imply – is through the imposition of binding and sufficiently instructive standards 
circumscribing their discretionary powers.118 This form of legislative control is also 
essential in providing stability and predictability and preventing arbitrary action 
regarding official language policy and practice across different national departments, 
public entities and enterprises.119 By requiring "legislative and other measures" to 
regulate official language use, the Constitution acknowledges the complexity of the 
subject-matter and the need for more detailed regulatory instruments. Into this 
cannot be read an intention to place legislative and other measures on the same 
level and to negate the constitutionally endorsed guiding function of legislation in 




In the final analysis the Act must be judged in terms of two fundamental 
considerations. Firstly, if Justice Sachs was correct that the principle of inclusivity 
shines through the language provisions of the Constitution, then the question is: 
does it shine through the Act, which after all was meant to implement those 
provisions? Secondly, does the Act represent clear progress in the quest for equity, 
clarity and predictability in official language use?  
 
In spite of its proclaimed objectives, the Act envisages a flawed institutional setting 
for the promotion of official multilingualism. The primary responsibility for giving 
effect to the directive principles of state language policy has been entrusted to non-
independent administrative organs within national state departments, national public 
                                                          
118  See Böckenförde "Demokratie als Verfassungsprizip" 900-901. 
119  For vagueness as a ground of judicial review, see generally Hoexter Administrative Law 298-301. 
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enterprises and entities. Apart from lacking the necessary institutional competence, 
these bodies will have to function in terms of a very limited, and to some extent, 
confused normative framework for the promotion of multilingualism. This framework 
does not embody an unambiguous commitment to the promotion of official 
multilingualism, lacks legal certainty, and endows administrative organs with 
insufficiently circumscribed discretionary powers.  
 
Given this state of affairs, the answer to both questions posed above must be 
negative. In so far as the Act has attempted to (re)kindle the flame of linguistic 
diversity, it has done so in a way that causes the "principle of diversity" to shine 
through its provisions only dimly, and most probably not lastingly. Neither does it 
represent any notable progress in the quest to achieve equity, clarity and 
predictability in official language use.  
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